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SUMMARY 
This paper presents a model of the dynamics of a 'socialist' 
(i.e. Soviet-type) economic system. A recursive system of seven 
difference equations summarises the links between indices of 
economic and political centralisation, capital investment, 
economic efficiency, shortages, political unrest and economic 
reform. The model is capable of generating economic and 
political fluctuations, of the kind actually observable in 
Soviet-type systems; the internal dynamics of the system 
are strongly affected by exogenous factors. 
POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC FLUCTUATIONS IN THE SOCIALIST SYSTEM * 
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European University Institute 
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1. Political and economic interactions 
It is widely recognised that there are strong and important inter-
. actions between political and economic factors in any economic system. 
In a socialist (i.e. Soviet-type) system, these interactions take several 
forms, such as : i) a link between economic and political centralisation 
levels; ii) a link between political centralisation and capital 
investment; iii) a link between full employment and workers' political 
strength through informal channels; iv) a link between economic achievement 
and the political legitimation of the system. While there are models for 
political-economic fluctuations in capitalist systems (e.g. Kalecki 1943; 
Nordhaus 1975; Frey and Schneider 1978), for socialist systems the discussion 
of these links and their piecing together into an organic model is 
still undeveloped. This is partly due to the dominance, in current 
literature, of the extreme views either that the socialist system is totally 
under the control of central planners and central committees, or that 
it is so chaotic as to lack an internal dynamics. 
In earlier work (Nuti 1979, 1981, 1984) I have presented a model 
of socialist dynamics, based on the observation of actual developments 
in Soviet-type economies, incorporating the links listed above 
and explaining the recurrence and failure of attempts at economic and 
political decentralisation. In this paper I shall outline the essential 
* Paper presented at the American Political Science Association Convention, 
Washington D.C., 30 August-2 Septembe! 1984 (Political Economy Section, 
Panel on Stresses and Contradictions of 'Real Socialism', 2 September). 
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features of this model, formulate a simplified mathematical version 
designed to represent the dynamics of major economic and political 
variables and provide a computer programme for the simulation of the 
behaviour of the system over time. 
2. The model 
The building blocks of the model are the following observable 
features of socialist development in Soviet-type systems : 
i) One-party rule and "democratic centralism" lead to the centra-
lised Soviet-type economic system; political democratisation induces the 
leadership to release their grip on the economy and, viceversa, any 
independently generated move towards marketisation of the economy favours 
political liberalisation. 
ii) Economic centralisation is associated with microeconomic ineffi-
ciency in the allocation of resources, for the choice of·production 
methods, their technical application, and the choice of consumption 
structure. 
iii) Economic and political centralisation lead to a bias towards 
capital accumulation. As long as there are labour reserves available, to 
man efficiently the newly accumulated and the already existing capital, 
this bias leads to rapid economic growth. After the exhaustion of labour 
reserves, however, this systemic accumulation bias leads to falling degrees 
of capital utilisation and excess demand for labour and intermediate inputs. 
iv) Systemic commitment to price stability prevents excess demand for 
labour and goods to be translated into higher (or higher enough) prices; 
shortages and queues ensue. Unless excess demand is alleviated by a positive 
net impact of exogenous factors (terms of trade and volume of world trade, 
agricultural output, technical ~dvance, etcetera) shortages become endemic. 
This tendency is reinforced by wage drift due to informal bargaining at 
the factory level; wage drift is not strong enough to eliminate excess 
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demand for labour but it fuels excess demand in view of upward inflexi-
bility of prices. 
v) The inefficiency of falling degrees of capital utilisation 
calls for economic reform; but at the same time the presence of shortages 
calls for centralisation; either reforms do not take place, or if they do 
they are doomed because marketisation cannot operate successfully in 
conditions of excess demand. Reform will succeed only if it takes place 
in (rarely and almost accidentally obtainable) conditions of economic 
tranquillity. 
vi) Without a successful economic reform, both shortages and ineffi-
.ciencies lead to political unrest; up to a critical level this leads to 
increasing political liberalisation, but beyond that level central response 
(as in Poland in December 1981) becomes that of increasing centralisation. 
Figure 1 (slightly modified from Nuti, 1981, p. 59) summarises this 
picture diagrammatically. The model is capable of producing three basic 
alternative paths, according to the types of functional relations and the 
value of their parameters, as well as the time pattern of (random) exogenous 
factors : i) a virtuous circle leading to progressive economic decentrali-
sation and political liberalisation towards liberal market socialism, ii) a 
vicious circle towards political anarchy and economic collapse, or iii) the 
more probable course of economic and political fluctuations. 
3. A mathematical formulation 
Let us define the following variables 
= Index of political centralisation = the length of the nomenklatura 
list, i.e. the number of appointments directly controlled by the 
party. 
= Index of political unrest = the excess of disaffected citizens 
over and above the number of citizens loyal to the regime, ~ 
r 
POLITICAL CENTRALISATION~(------------------------- POLITICAL UNREST 
+ or -
SUCCESSFUL NO REFORM OR 
/.REFORM REFORM FAILURE 
I 
I 
! 
i 
I 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 
// : ~\ 
PRESSURE ~0 PRESSURE TO 
~FORM CENTRALISE 
I 
INSTABILITY AND 
INEFFICIENCY 
I 
SHORTAGES ~ 
SYSTEMIC 
COMMITMENT 
-TO PRICE 
STABILITY 
\ /1 
FULL EMPLOYMENT 
~ 
ECONOMIC 
GROWTH 
'\ 
WAGE DRIFT 
~ 
EXCESS 
DEMAND 
I 
< 
+ 
or 
WORLD TRADE 
TERMS OF TRADE 
AGRICULTURAL OUTPUT 
INTERNATIONAL. CREDIT 
(AVAILABILITY AND' 
TERMS) 
DEFENCE 
TECHNICAL ADVANCE 
I 
RESOURCE EXHAUSTION' 
ECONOMIC CENTRALISATION ------------------------- ACCUMULATION BIAS AND DISCOVERY 
Fig. 1 The mechanism of political and economic fluctuations in the socialist system. 
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alternatively the absolute change in party membership, with its 
sign reversed. 
Political centralisation and unrest are so related (as in (vi) 
above): 
~ 
PC 1 + a - b.PU 1 where a>O, 1>b>O, for PU~PU; t- t-
+ g.PU 1 where c~O, 1>g>O, for PU>PU; t-
r-/ 
Thus up to the critical level PU political unrest reduces political 
centralisation and possibly more than offsets the natural centralisa-
tion tendency of the system (otherwise ever-increasing due to a>O), 
while beyond that critical level political unrest evokes a drastic 
authoritarian response and is counterproductive. 
Figure 2 represents relationship (1) diagrammatically. Segment 
BC can be interpreted as a measure of the maximum absolute rate of 
change of which the system is capable in the direction of liberali-
sation under the pressure of sustained political unrest. Pessimism 
about the political reformability of the system would be reflected by 
high values of ~ and ~ coefficients, and low values of PU and the 
length of BC (if BC is negative; if C was in the positive quadrant 
the system would be inexorably moving towards ever-increasing centra-
lisation regardless of circumstances). These parameters indicate 
different aspects of reformability, which are often confused in the 
literature: ~measures the natural tendency of the system in the 
absence of political unrest; ~measures the degree of response to 
political unrest; BC measures the maximum speed at which the system 
can be reformed; PU measures the maximum level of political unrest 
which the authorities are willing to tolerate. (We could introduce 
also a maximum absolute rate of change for PC, or a maximum level of 
PC which is reached when political centralisation is total). 
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Fig. 2. The relationship between political unrest and changes in 
political centralisation. 
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Political centralisation in turn affects economic centralisation. 
We define: 
EC = Index of economic centralisation = the number of centrally allocated 
("funded") commodities, .£!:. alternatively the number of compulsory 
indicators given to the enterprise. 
N The fall in economic centralisation that occurs when both economic 
efficiency EF (defined below) is on the increase and shortages 
SH, defined below, are equal to or less than zero. 
(2) ECt = h + i.PCt + Nt-l where h, i>O; N<O 
Economic centralisation affects the level of capital investment: 
(3) m + n.ECt where m~O and n>O. 
SH = Shortages = excess demand (negative in the presence of excess 
supply, in which case inventories pile up above desired levels), 
in absolute terms; 
Z Random factor (~0) reflecting the net combined effect of exogenous 
factors (such as world trade volume, terms of trade, volume and terms 
of ~xternal credit, external security requirements, technical advance, 
resource exhaustion and discovery) on resources available for internal 
use, in absolute terms. (Obviously the longer the period considered 
the greater is the need to make at least some of these factors endo-
genous). 
EF Economic efficiency = the ratio of actual to theoretically available 
output, x 100, ££ alternatively such a ratio divided by its previous 
value, x lOO. 
Shortages have an adverse effect on economic efficiency: 
(4) where p>O. 
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We could introduce a lower limit for EF (especially if defined according 
to the first of the alternative definitions above), below which economic 
collapse would occur (leading to total disruption of production and 
distribution of goods). Alternatively, we could imagine a lower limit 
to EF (especially if defined according to the second definition above) 
beyond which the system could not fall, because of the greater ease with 
which output levels already experienced can be recovered. The introduc-
tion of limits of this kind would model one's convictions about the 
economic viability of the socialist system which one is considering. 
No limits of either kind are introduced here. 
(5) 
(6) 
, otherwise. 
Finally, political unrest is fuelled by shortages and ineffi-
ciency: 
This completes the model. The seven equations in seven unknowns 
(PC, PU, EC, N, I, SH, EF), given initial values PC , N , EF , SH and 0 0 0 0 
PU , as well as 15 parameters (a, b, c, g; h, i; m, n; p; q, r; s, u; 
0 
v, w), and a randomly generated variable Z, are capable of determining 
the dynamics of the whole system. 
For the model to embody the differences in system behaviour with and 
without the availability of labour reserves it would be necessary to 
replace equation (5) with (5') for periods in which labour reserves are 
available: 
(5') , where k>O 
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because in that case investment reduces current shortages through its 
positive effect on supply rather than add to the pressure of demand. 
It would also be necessary to add a labour supply and a labour demand 
function, in order to discriminate whether equation (5) or (5') should 
apply. 
This model is capable of generating economic and political fluctua-
tions, of the kind actually observable in Soviet-type systems. For it 
to represent the possibility of take-off into democratic market socialism 
it is necessary to define critical lower bounds for EC and PC below which 
a reformed socialist system is achieved (presumably altering the appli-
cable parameters, functions and possibly the model itself). For the 
model to represent the possibility of political and economic collapse 
it is necessary to define critical upper bounds for PU and SH, and 
possibly a lower bound for EF, beyond which economic anarchy prevails 
and a revolution (or at any rate a potentially revolutionary situation) 
would occur. 
The Appendix to this paper presents a computer. programme which can 
be used to simulate the dynamics of this model for given values of para-
meters, initial variables and critical thresholds for EC, PU and EF. It 
is not difficult to think of further refinements; the use of machine 
code and sound could easily turn this programme into an academics' video-
game. The purpose of this exercise, however, remains that of exploring the 
political and economic interactions between major variables in a socialist 
system, and from that viewpoint it is doubtful whether mathematical or 
programming refinements could add much to the simplified structure 
presented here. The model, however, is making use of variables which 
are carefully defined in such a way as to be quantifiable and measurable. 
For some of the variables (such as PC, or EC, or PU) data are not avail-
able from statistical publications, but the problem of collecting time 
series for suitably selected proxies is now difficult, but not concept-
ually or practically insurmountable. Once suitable data are available, 
it should be possible to test the explanatory power of a model of this 
kind, to improve and develop it, and to turn from the production of a 
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plausible picture to actual forecasting. Meanwhile, the main contribu-
tion of this type of model should be the ~ealisation that in spite of 
central control of economy and society the socialist system is a complex 
structure with its own internal dynamics, and does not lend itself to 
facile predictions about either its progress or its collapse. 
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APPENDIX: A programme for the simulation of socialist dynamics (SOCDYN) 
The following programme has been written in BASIC for a Sinclair 
SPECTRUM; it will work with both the 16K and the 48K versions. It can 
be easily translated into other languages. 
Programme lines 10-14 label the progamme, named "SOCDYN" for 
Socialist Dynamics. Lines 15-19 describe it briefly, give notation 
and ask the operator to indicate whether a numerical printout or a 
graphic display are required. 
Lines 20-21 give initial values to some of the variables, namely 
PC = 100, EF 100, EF 1 = 100, PU 0, SH = 0, N = 0; t is a 0 0 - 0 0 0 
counter and is set to 1. 
Lines 20-120 give the whole model. Parameters are set at the 
following values: a= c = 0; b = g 0.1; h = 100, i = 1; m= 0, n 0.1; 
p = 0.1; q = -125; r = 5; s = 0; u 0.2; v = w = 1. These values, 
obtained after a few tentative iterations, describe fairly well the 
operation of the model; for PU = 60 there appears to be no need for 
upper or lower bounds for any variables; for lower values of PU it 
would be necessary to introduce an upper limit for PC. The programme 
generate~ a political and economic cycle. Lines 65, 112 and 115 set 
critical values to EF, PU and EC; if EF falls below 85 the economy 
collapses; if PU raises beyond 80 or if the economy collapses the 
system ends. If economic decentralisation occurs at a time when the 
economy goes very well (i.e. if EC falls below 160 when N>O), the system 
is deemed to have been successfully reformed. Alternative beliefs about 
political reformability, economic viability and the success of reforms, 
as well as degrees of pessimism or optimism, can be reflected in alterna-
tive values for these parameters and critical values. Greater and more 
lifelike instability is generated by deleting line 70, in which case 
critical limits for EF, PU and EC are necessary. 
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Lines 121-146 print a sequence of values for PC, EC, I, EF, Z, SH, 
N and PU, which goes on until critical limits for EF, PU and EC are 
reached, or otherwise indefinitely to the exhaustion of memory, filling 
the screen, clearing it and filling it again if required. 
Lines 150-170 give a graphic colour display for PC, EC, I, EF and 
PU, which also goes on as the numerical printout. Graphs are labelled, 
but often graph patterns become confused and it may be preferable to 
display two variables only at once, i.e. choosing only two among lines 
150-156 at any time. 
Lines 200-400 print messages if and when critical values for EF, 
PU and EC are reached. 
1pj REM "SOCDYN" 
12 BORDER 1: INK~: PRINT AT 4 
,6;"SOCIALIST DYNAMICS": PAUSE 1 
~p 
13 PRINT AT 8,6; "Copyright D. 
M. Nuti": PAUSE 1~% 
14 PRINT: PRINT "European Univ 
ersity Institute S.Domenico di 
Fiesole Florence, Ita 
ly Tel.~55-477 9 
31": PAUSE 15~: CLS 
15 BORDER.2: PRINT "This progr 
amme will simulate theinternal d 
ynamics of a socialistsystem, ba 
sed on the interactionof economi 
c and political factors." 
16 PRINT: PRINT "The followin 
g notation is used: PC=political 
centralisation EC=economic 
centralisation 
EF=efficiency 
random factor 
N=endogenous 
entralisation 
unrest" 
17 PRINT : PRINT 
me will give you a 
sequential values 
bles indicated 
u want a graphic 
ead, press 1, 
!=investment 
Z=exogenous 
SH=shortages 
economic dec 
PU=political 
"This program 
printout of 
of the varia 
above. If yo 
display inst 
otherwise pr 
ess ~. Press ENTER" 
18 INPUT A 
19 CLS 
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2{d LET PC=1~jJ: LET EF=1f/)fi: LET 
EFS=1~~: LET PU=~: LET SH=Y: LE 
T N=jJ 
25 LET t=l: PRINT "SOCIALIST D 
YNAMICS - by D.M. Nuti" 
3~ LET PC=PC+(PU<=6~)*(-~.1*PU 
)+(PU>6~)*(1.1*PU) 
4~ LET EC=1~~+PC-N 
5ft/ LET I=fl.1*EC 
6~ LET EF=EF-~.1*SH 
65 IF EF<85 THEN GO TO 3~~ 
7RJ RANDOMIZE 
8~ LET Z=RND*2~-1~ 
90 LET SH=5*(1-25-Z) 
1~~ LET N=(SH<=~ AND EF>EFS)*~· 
2~*EC 
11fl LET PU=SH+EFS-EF 
112 IF PU>8~ THEN GO TO 4~~ 
115 IF (N>~)+(EC<16~)=2 THEN GO 
TO 29.)~ 
12flJ LET EFS=EF 
121 IF A=1 THEN GO TO 15~ 
125 LET y=t+4 
13~ BORDER 1: INK~: PRINT AT 3 
,9';"PC": PRINT AT 3,5;"EC": PRIN 
TAT 3,1~;"I": PRINT AT 3,14;"EF 
":PRINT AT 3,18;"Z": PRINT AT 3 
,21;"SH": PRINT AT 3,25;"N": PRI 
NT AT 3,29; "PU" 
135 PRINT AT y,%; INT PC: PRINT 
AT y,4; INT EC: PRINT AT y,9;INT 
I: PRINT AT y,13;INT EF: PRINT A 
T y,17; INT Z: PRINT AT y,21;INT 
· SH: PRINT AT y ,25; INT N: PRINT A 
T y,28; INT PU 
14~ IF t>15 THEN GO TO 146 
145 LET t=t+1: GO TO 3~ 
146 PAUSE 4~: CLS: GO TO 21 
15~ IF t=2 THEN GO SUB 17flJ 
151 INK 2: PLOT t+15,PC/2 
152 INK ~: PLOT t+15,EC/5 
153 INK 6: PLOT t+15,I 
154 INK 3: PLOT t+15, EF/4+4, 
155 INK 5: PLOT t+15, 4~~·2*PU 
16~ LET t=t+1: IF t>24~ THEN GO 
SUB 17~ 
165 GO TO 3~ 
17~ PAUSE 6~: CLS: PRINT AT 21-
INT(PC/16),~; "PC": PRINT AT 21-
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INT(EC/4,0),/A; "EC": PRINT AT 21-
INT(I/S),~;"I": PRINT AT 21.;..INT 
(EF/32+5),~;"EF'~: PRINT AT 21-IN 
T(5+~.~25*PU),~;"PU":LET t=3: 
RETURN ' 
2(J~ PRINT "Democratic Market So 
cialism has been successfully in 
traduced. Comrades of all worl 
d, rejoice!": STOP 
3~,0 PRINT "The economy has coll 
apsed." 
4~~ PRINT "A popular revolution 
has restored capitalism. 
THE END". 
